Showing posts with label aesthetics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aesthetics. Show all posts

Thursday, October 1, 2026

Review of Aesthetics & Alienation, by Gary Tedman, Zero Books, 2012

By Iona Singh

Aesthetics & Alienation is rigorous, most of the chapters first appeared as peer-reviewed essays, and it is audacious in its assimilation of the clash between ideology and materialism, which Tedman elucidates in the early chapter ‘Ideology, the State and the Aesthetic Level of Practice’:

 “I am going to argue that ideas alone, even ideas networked in the mutually compatible interrelations of an ideology, cannot and do not (not solely) provide such a fusion of superstructure with infrastructure as would be truly capable of consolidating a society ravaged by inherent class divisions. For it appears to me to give too much potency to the stuff of ideology – to ideas – than a materialist should, perhaps, allow. “

Tedman wants to intervene here with emotions, rather than ideas, using an original conception of the term "aesthetic", the literal meaning of which is the heightening of human sensibilities and the opposite of anaesthetic, which is to dull them down. He analyses 'emotion' on a physiological and psychological level using Freud's concept of intuition and 'reflex' to endown this 'aesthetic' with a non-humanistic framework, separate from the transcendental and metaphysical history associated with the term. And in our current system it is the deadening of aesthetic sensibilities that "works up" physically derived alienation via the media, artworks, entertainment, and culture generally,  not on critical or intellectual levels but on the basis of desires and reactions and in practical and physical forms.

Feelings are ‘deep’, they have libidinal and unconscious elements, they are slower to change than ideas, and they straddle both the economic base and the superstructure. Consequently, as Tedman carefully describes it: feelings, sensibilities and aesthetics are the fundamental power sources that drive the reproduction of the means of production and hence enable Capitalism to continue.  

Tedman argues that the study of this qualifies as a new discipline and domain that he refers to as the Aesthetic Level of Practice. Once defined in this aspect the concept is then utilised in the book as a powerful addendum to shift and conjecture the work of a host of writers, including Marx, Freud and Walter Benjamin, as well as a number of historical events, and artworks.

The theoretical framework is set up first in Feelings and Ideas in Marx, Freud and Althusser and specifically in their undermining of two “pinnacles of bourgeois ideology”. The first being Freud's location of psychic forces that are beyond the conscious control of the indivdual and hence his shattering of the “self-aware unity of the thinking subject” - the myth that humans are psychologically Captain of their own ship. The second of these is Marx’s dethroning of ‘Man’ as the subject of history and no longer the central, wilful, driving force, because of the impact of the economic base and dialectical materialism. For Tedman, the amalgamation of these two critiques, the micro and the macro, opens up the territory that exists between psychology and politics that can only be bridged by the complex role of feeling. This expanse is so viable that bourgeois ideology has been moved to prohibit the realisation of it, by keeping key elements that compose it, mainly art and science, separate. Nevertheless, the outreach of this level, as Tedman explains it, is present in all affective domains: the media, education, entertainment and the arts, and in 'affective practices' - manners, class affiliations, modes of dress, which he then begins to examine the mechanics of.

There is an early necessary reflection on how nature and nurture fit in to this, in Notes towards a Foundation for a Subjectless Aesthetic. Here, cognitive classification for the concept is sought using the study of deaf children by the linguist Ann Senghas, to show that the aesthetic level is a ‘merging’ of visceral and intellectual faculties similar to those used in the development of language and like language this ability is stimulated by the environment. These findings are a counterclaim to the ‘innate’ humanist charge that overhangs discussions on feelings and the sentient; claims that were most famously made against Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, when he discusses emotional alienation within the mode of production. Hence Tedman’s chapter, Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts as a Work of Art reexamines this early classic and contests that Marx was himself on the path to understanding a non-humanist, materialist aesthetic component as part of the base and superstructure model.

In fact Marx’s awareness of the role of feeling resides not only in the ideas and writing in this text but also because of the three-dimensional structure of Marx’s own original construction of the text.  For Marx did not create this book in a linear fashion, as it has so far been published (and as book publishing will allow), but he designed it so that the structure of the book expresses its content in a sculptural, three-dimensional format. One example drawn from this by Tedman, using some of Margaret Fay’s original research, is how Marx organised the themes of Wages of Labour and Profit of Capital, in separate columns, on the same page side by side, with the theoretical contradictions between them revealed in these columns in adjacent positions. Eventually, some of the columns, overwhelmed by these contradictions, cancel themselves out and disappear all-together, and hence the shape of the work changes, suggesting that:

 “Marx must have been attempting to restructure his own material method of textual production in line with the results of his research.”

Is Marx making a work of art out of his ideas and forging them tactually and sensibly in order to communicate their influence to his reader, and does this work therefore perform on the aesthetic level? It certainly shows that Marx was aware of the feelings of the reader and that he could practice an engagement with the visceral and the corporeal to strengthen his intellectual points, rather than just ignoring these things as many writers do, or dulling them down, as in an alienating or biblical-narrative type framework. By the construction of the form of this work Marx demonstrates that sensory alienation and also non-alienation, major theoretical themes in the Manuscripts, are not just cerebral but tied to materials and shapes, design and general sensory environments.

 The ‘bourgeois’ humanist accusation levelled at Marx in his discussion of feelings and alienation in the text is countered here in favour of the bodily reality and formality of his writing, and the physical ‘shape’ and texture of it (the large landscape sheets of paper handsewn together by Marx play an important part in this). Tedman concludes:

“the EPM, is equivalent to an avant-garde left modernist artwork, but with a rather postmodern, hypertextual deconstructive, textual strategy”.

For Tedman, Marx's awareness of an aesthetic, sense level of practice is always present in his work (he furnishes examples from Capital) even if it is not as radically and artistically expressed as in this early work, understood as a radical new form for a radical new content.

Tedman reconstructed Marx's original design for the 1844 Manuscripts using large sheets of paper and has also published an ebook facimile of this using hypertext links and the original pagination. 

The origins of the aesthetic level are examined in the following chapters: East/West and the Marx-Zeno Dialectic, looks at the counter-feeling, logocentric tradition of Western philosophy. This is posed against the ‘other’ sensuous element of some Eastern philosophies and in relation to Marx’s interest, via Hegel, in the pre-Socratics, to throw light on the non-logocentric, feeling and hence aesthetic slant of his ideas.

The Origins of Kitsch and Counterfeit Dialectics examines the emergence of an aesthetic that is now integrated into everyday life - and how kitsch became the proscribed aesthetic of the ruling class and entered into the class struggle via the official status given to it by the French Academy. And from here on in it emerged practically, specifically through art objects, actions, behaviours, mentalities, and events, even whole periods (the Third Republic).

To examine this we are taken through the changes in the mode of production in Capitalism that led to the specific form of associated alienation for which kitsch is the formal, visual, psychological and artistic expression.  We see how it was specially promoted via the work of artists like Charles Le Brun, who was chosen in the 1600s to head up the group organisation of the French Academy of Art. Based in anthropomorphism, Le Brun’s work heralds the debasement of humanness and of the human senses, “the likening of humans to animals and animals to humans (homo faber).” …and helped to forge the substantiation of dehumanisation and alienation. Tedman submits that imbuing Le Brun with such power at this point in time created an important fulcrum for the state to fulfil its political desires in aesthetics.

Another example of struggles taking place specifically on the aesthetic level comes from the political context of the July Monarchy of Louis Phillippe, which is the theme of the chapter Paris 1844, Manet, Courbet, Marx. Here Tedman demonstrates a convergence of clashes and contradictions that appear to manifest on this date and place, various aspects of which are observed in the political, philosophical and artist production of these three protagonists.

The origins of artists like Le Brun in all epochs, whose work fits neatly into the correct type of aesthetic necessary for the needs of the dominating mode of production is revealed by Tedman’s intersection of the writings of Clement Greenberg, Louis Althusser and Walter B enjamin, which leads him to the conclusion that there is  indeed such an entity as Art Aesthetic State Apparatuses. He finds this:- in Althusser’s critique that bourgeois philosophers maintain a very strict distinction (bifurcation) between science and ideology which then filters down through education and specifically art education, coupled with a denial, on the part of these philosophers of knowing what philosophy is actually doing, as a practice; and, from Walter Benjamin’s criticism of those “undergoing a revolutionary development only in terms of mentality” and who distance their work from technique (the amalgamation of tactile and ‘feelings’ in materials) and hence its relationship to the current day mode of production and means of production. Artists who are like this, says Benjamin, have solidarity with the proletariat only in the mind and not as material producers; and while, says Tedman, Greenberg champions the formal materialism of American Expressionism (Rothko, Jackson Pollock) he still writes about it from a position of the unaccountable in tandem with the general line in educational art departments that ‘there is no accounting for taste’. And this point of view is the political and philosophical basis for the artist who is embedded in the Capitalist social relations of production. These relations are then refined and shaped by them in their specific field of production to become an aesthetic that emerges from the prevailing social fabric and from the controlling state bodies behind them, as Aesthetic State Apparatuses. This is also helped by the fact that the subject who is embedded in this environment as an artist functions partly unconsciously amongst the prevailing alienation of these conditions.

We find that a real examination of the physical and mental affectivity of these issues is prohibited because this would involve science over the prevalent denial of knowledge and a development of the relationship between science and art. The argument that these conditions begin very early in the formation of the subject, is also advanced in the chapters The Family as Aesthetic State Apparatus and Art and Education.

One of the final chapters Soviet Avant Garde Aesthetics: the Art ASA and Gender in the Russian Revolution uses the aesthetic level and the concept of aesthetic state apparatuses to analyse “base/superstructure interaction in the period of the emergence of the artistic avant-garde in Russia” about 1917.

Here, Tedman charts the breaking down of gender barriers that led to a flurry of woman artists, such as has not been seen before or since, and of changes to the arts, artworks, literature and design because of changes in the base. This is complex. The domains of art and economics, for example, although they are obviously linked, do not develop at the same rate, and in relation to each other they are, using Lenin's concept, “uneven”. A mechanism for the aesthetic level is thus honed in on in the writings of Malevich, which tended to be  quite meta-physical at times, though not always, (perhaps lost in translation also), and not quite in tandem with his more materialist artistic production. So we find that Malevich’s visual practice as it functions on the aesthetic level contradicts his intellectual theorisation, thus exposing a contradiction between the aesthetic level (his paintings) and what could probably be described as the ideological level (his conscious intellect and writings).

Aesthetics & Alienation offers the chance to examine relationships between the state, the status quo, and sentient emotion, the latter of which is argued as the most necessary element for ‘glueing’ the other elements and hence the base/superstructure and the social system, together. This is a basis for understanding how feelings can be and are directed by the industries and institutions that primarily specialise in their arousal: the media, the arts, design and education. The essays are anchored in convincing arguments and research that give credence to the proposed ‘scientificity’ of the method and the enquiry. With so much discussion in many domains, perhaps the conjecture steps a bit ahead of itself sometimes and of the reader, but this is always reeled back quite quickly and the overall points are eloquently concluded.

From my own point of view this book offers an inspiring improvement on the gossipy narrative that grounds most art history and that I have always found inadequate, and of the possibility of substantially linking art to other fields. Hence the poor dandyish ‘flimsy’ and ‘bourgeois’ subject no longer stands, sadly, alone but becomes engaged in a whole fabric of connected knowledge including politics. Aesthetics & Alienation delivers real philosophical and political credibility to the role of feelings which concerns every discipline, social science and aesthetic practitioners like artists, designers and architects. Until now these latter have seen little inroad into the huge traditional body of philosophy and science that can really offer support to the scientific materiality of their own disciplines, and signficantly place them in relation to other subjects that they are intuitively, if not officially in the academic sense, intertwined with.

Gary Tedman's facsimile version of Marx's original construction of The Notebooks 1844, Karl Marx: The Hypertext Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 is available in Kindle format from Amazon. Amazon link here

Thursday, September 10, 2026

Why do Communists and the Left always have to be Shouty Humanists in the Media?

For reasons to do with the way the media functions in democratic capitalism as a state apparatus,* this apparatus only allows communists to appear in the media as ‘shouty humanists’, in other words they must seem to place sentiment and moralism before science, and passion and emotionalism before reason, entirely going against the grain of classical Marxism. This is of course a way to prove in practice to the audience all the usual falsehoods about communists, from the mild reproaches of them being well meaning but inevitably wrong idealists to always angry totalitarian dictators.

This strategy has worked very well for the bourgeoisie for years now, even to the extent that leaders of most of the western communist parties usually follow this rule, and such conforming individuals are able rise to the top of these parties for this reason. The question is how this happens; there are two essential ways that such eventualities come to be: The first is by the simple process of reward and punishment, those individuals who follow these rules are rewarded by the system, mostly obliquely, and given more airtime and so on and thus seem more apparently successful than their opponents. Secondly, there is an unconscious following of these rules in the general sense, with persons with affective practices that behave 'obdiently' felt to be more socially positive. The latter is because of the underlying alienation from labour in capitalism.

Any Marxist will know that Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao, were fairly personable people in terms of their personalities. They were witty, highly intelligent and had the ability to write many books. They were theorists of communism but also studied the contemporary philosophy and sciences and were up to date with the most advanced scientific theories in diverse fields. Marx for instance could both read, speak, and translate on sight multiple languages. Of these figures, only Lenin and Mao became the leaders of actual political parties.

However, since this time, such individuals have, I think, been prevented by various means. To start with, in politics in general there has been a pervasive anti-intellectualism and suspicion of those who ‘know stuff’ in favour of those whose demeanour is more spontaneous and passionate. For instance, there has been, e.g. in the UK, on the left Arthur Scargill (miners leader), and Neil Kinnock, and currently in France there is Jean Luc Melenchon of LFI, or there was Georges Marchais of the PCF. In all these cases their political positions have been presented in the media in shouty humanistic terms (I am aware that Kinnock was hardly a communist of course).  We could of course debate whether these individuals were sincere or not, but really this is not the point. Also, one must be aware of politics in at least more than one democratic capitalist country to truly see how this is a pattern, a technique.

- The media has been a modern technical mass media since at least the rise of the Nazis, and it has been able to use mass techniques and has a lot of practical knowledge based in how to sway feelings, and make it seem as though certain things and positions and people are popular, and they are capable of pushing certain things that they as a class want, but can make that pushing seem like audience pull, as if it is the democratic will of the authentic masses. The new social media despite its great promise has only made this more intense through the constant intervention of troll farms and biased computerized algorithms.

This brings me to the concept of Affective Practices and to the idea of contradiction within an affective practice. Which means, whilst it is possible for a person to express ideas that are rational or Marxist, it is at the same time possible for this same individual to behave affectively in a manner that goes against this. I would venture to say that this is even the norm for most of the media figures on the political left who get near to socialism.

The techniques of how the bourgeois class deal with this problem of appearance, and what is essentially the process of political branding involves a body of knowledge that has been built up over decades in the apparatuses of the media which they either own or direct via the state.


* The theory of the media that allows me to say these things (rather raw and newly formed I admit) I have worked on elsewhere, likewise the concept of alienation that I am using here can be read about and is supported in my book Aesthetics & Alienation. Note that here I have only been able to say these things in a schematic fashion, unfortunately

Gary Tedman

Saturday, January 13, 2024

THEORY: Humanism and Humanitarianism (regarding Gaza)

Humanism is a philosophy that, to put it simply, replaces classic religions with ‘Man’ or the 'Human Spirit'. There are many kinds of humanism, there is even a version of socialist humanism, sometimes called utopian socialism (Engels wrote against this tendency). Often Marx is described wrongly as a humanist, or in humanist terms.

The link between humanism as a philosophy and humanitarianism might seem obvious at first glance, the ethics of humanism appears to call for an understanding of the human spirit that is essentially humanitarian, in that it apparently cares for people.

Is it possible to be humanitarian without also being humanist?

You might assume that all ideologies, politics, religions, and philosophies, can advocate humanitarianism if they want, but is this true?

Marxism is not a version of humanism (the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser wrote about this), but this does not stop it from being a supporter of humanitarian measures. However, it should be circumspect of humanitarianism at least, for its close connection with humanism. This is because the humanist face is bound to be two sided. The kindly caring one and the cold hearted one, this is its Janus face. Its caring attitude can easily flip over into anger and hatred, in fact it can encourage this, because some versions of this philosophy are based on understanding things sentimentally, and as essence or innate spirit: for instance, ethnic essences and nationalities. Nationalism therefore has these two sides and is a form of humanism.

You can consider most media to be fundamentally humanist in orientation. For instance, because they always refer to nations as ‘thinking’ and ‘deciding’ certain things, Britain thinks this, the US thinks that; Israel wants this, etc. This is true especially for the capitalist democracies, where the leviathan (Hobbes) that is understood as generated by the electorate, becomes identified with the popular will via the elected government, and this is then assumed to be ‘Israel’, or ‘France’ etc.

This is also anthropomorphic, unless we really believe in the myth of the leviathan, the giant human figure as a manifestation of a democratic will.

The question as to whether voting can generate such a thing, in spirit, whether democratic representation of this kind is real or not, in detail unfortunately must be left aside here, it is a long argument. But suffice it to say, fundamentally such humanist framing of the debate automatically excludes any discussion of class conflict in the media, except on rare occasions. It is not just a question of laziness on the part of the media worker (although considering class certainly makes the positions of nations more complex, so it probably plays a part), but a reflection of the inertia of the media as an industry, which I suggest we call a state apparatus of the ruling class.

The media of course presents itself as free, as the ‘free press’ etc, which adds to this notion of the universal ‘spirit’ or ‘will’ of the people thought to be expressed in this media.

You can see that a great deal hinges on this concept of democratic representation, the freedom achieved by this, and the free media, which is a part of the same humanist framework. Whilst Eisenhower warned us to watch out for the military-industrial complex regarding the far right, he left out any questioning of a media-industrial complex, presumably because this was what he was using to make his warning; it is in fact a more hidden secret of bourgeois rule, the close relation between capitalist industry and the industry that is the media.

Sometimes communists are drawn to the idea of being a family and a ‘broad church’, perhaps being influenced by the sheer ubiquitousness of this humanist media (almost every film, TV series, news source, has this ideology and aesthetic underlying it), but the communist concept of being a comrade really comes from being soldierly, being comrades at arms, in a class struggle, and of course the family can be understood as an apparatus of the state, so not always a good thing, there are of course also abusive families, and patriarchal families, and exploitative families.

On the other hand, sometimes we communists go to the other extreme to get away from this quagmire, and end up seeming unemotional, almost sociopathic, for whom everything comes down to economics and science, so this is not the entire answer, we should not fall into this false dialectical opposition in the first place.   

Is humanitarianism really something exclusive to humanism, does it force a humanist philosophy on whoever adopts a humanitarian approach?

In the same way that the love of God was often practised as the missionary arm of conquerors, enslavers, and colonisers, I suggest the humanitarianism of modern times are a way to enforce modern, basically western, ethics onto the people who are to be exploited, and to excuse their massacres when they become necessary to them.

Today there are many institutions, like the UN and the non-governmental aid agencies, plus those that watch over the conventions of war and international criminality such as the ICJ (International Court of Justice, a part of the UN) or the ICC (International Criminal Court), that hold to the humanist philosophical ethos. They are all very western in orientation. This is presumably why they seem reluctant and slow to take to task any central western power if they breach these rules, this is not who the rules are intended to apply to, - themselves in other words.

A relevant current example: recently some western powers led by the USA and the UK bombed the rebel Houthis in Yemen for trying to defend the Palestinian civilians in Gaza by attacking shipping trade routes through the Red Sea, which is very important to global capitalism, led by the USA, and one of the few avenues for resistance available. This bombing by these western powers was authorized by the UN. Yet, the highest UN court, the ICJ, if it finds Israel guilty of genocide in the case currently being brought by South Africa against Israel, would automatically justify the actions of the Houthis (I suggest) and make the attacks of these western countries and the UN complicit in defending genocidal acts. In short, the UN would be contravening itself. I am certain that it is doing so in any case.

These institutions generally support the rules of the capitalist mode of production and exchange. To exploit a fresh market, the exploited must feel the superiority of the conquering force, which says that it is not just by force alone that it rules, but by spirit too, it must also have the moral high ground, it must not just win by its superior force, it must win in all other ways, morally, aesthetically, it must seem to be at the forefront of ethics, and have the complete right to rule.

We might ask, why can the ruling class not simply look itself in the mirror and say that it wants to further its imperial strategy to secure future economic profits and is willing to kill innocent civilians to achieve this? Well, presumably it perceives as a class that a significant tactical advantage is to be gained by supporting certain myths about itself in its media, it must be important for its self-image and so for its morale in the class struggle, as well as to spoil and confuse the understanding of their opponents in this struggle and so to reduce their class morale.

So therefore, the question of Marxist science versus humanism is a crucial one exactly on this point. Does a Marxist humanist conception improve the confidence of the working class and communists in the class struggle? Not really, since it is, ultimately, approving all these myths of freedom within bourgeois class rule and about its essential righteousness and fairness, all the while it is carrying out the ruthless expansion of capital interests. It is not just conjuring away the class consciousness of its struggle and its interests in this struggle; but preventing the feelings that correspond to this from flourishing, of comradeship and solidarity, leading to feelings of isolation which it might seem only the media can solve.

 

 

 


Review of Aesthetics & Alienation, by Gary Tedman, Zero Books, 2012

By Iona Singh Aesthetics & Alienation is rigorous, most of the chapters first appeared as peer-reviewed essays, and it is audacious i...