Showing posts with label Marx. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marx. Show all posts

Thursday, October 1, 2026

Review of Aesthetics & Alienation, by Gary Tedman, Zero Books, 2012

By Iona Singh

Aesthetics & Alienation is rigorous, most of the chapters first appeared as peer-reviewed essays, and it is audacious in its assimilation of the clash between ideology and materialism, which Tedman elucidates in the early chapter ‘Ideology, the State and the Aesthetic Level of Practice’:

 “I am going to argue that ideas alone, even ideas networked in the mutually compatible interrelations of an ideology, cannot and do not (not solely) provide such a fusion of superstructure with infrastructure as would be truly capable of consolidating a society ravaged by inherent class divisions. For it appears to me to give too much potency to the stuff of ideology – to ideas – than a materialist should, perhaps, allow. “

Tedman wants to intervene here with emotions, rather than ideas, using an original conception of the term "aesthetic", the literal meaning of which is the heightening of human sensibilities and the opposite of anaesthetic, which is to dull them down. He analyses 'emotion' on a physiological and psychological level using Freud's concept of intuition and 'reflex' to endown this 'aesthetic' with a non-humanistic framework, separate from the transcendental and metaphysical history associated with the term. And in our current system it is the deadening of aesthetic sensibilities that "works up" physically derived alienation via the media, artworks, entertainment, and culture generally,  not on critical or intellectual levels but on the basis of desires and reactions and in practical and physical forms.

Feelings are ‘deep’, they have libidinal and unconscious elements, they are slower to change than ideas, and they straddle both the economic base and the superstructure. Consequently, as Tedman carefully describes it: feelings, sensibilities and aesthetics are the fundamental power sources that drive the reproduction of the means of production and hence enable Capitalism to continue.  

Tedman argues that the study of this qualifies as a new discipline and domain that he refers to as the Aesthetic Level of Practice. Once defined in this aspect the concept is then utilised in the book as a powerful addendum to shift and conjecture the work of a host of writers, including Marx, Freud and Walter Benjamin, as well as a number of historical events, and artworks.

The theoretical framework is set up first in Feelings and Ideas in Marx, Freud and Althusser and specifically in their undermining of two “pinnacles of bourgeois ideology”. The first being Freud's location of psychic forces that are beyond the conscious control of the indivdual and hence his shattering of the “self-aware unity of the thinking subject” - the myth that humans are psychologically Captain of their own ship. The second of these is Marx’s dethroning of ‘Man’ as the subject of history and no longer the central, wilful, driving force, because of the impact of the economic base and dialectical materialism. For Tedman, the amalgamation of these two critiques, the micro and the macro, opens up the territory that exists between psychology and politics that can only be bridged by the complex role of feeling. This expanse is so viable that bourgeois ideology has been moved to prohibit the realisation of it, by keeping key elements that compose it, mainly art and science, separate. Nevertheless, the outreach of this level, as Tedman explains it, is present in all affective domains: the media, education, entertainment and the arts, and in 'affective practices' - manners, class affiliations, modes of dress, which he then begins to examine the mechanics of.

There is an early necessary reflection on how nature and nurture fit in to this, in Notes towards a Foundation for a Subjectless Aesthetic. Here, cognitive classification for the concept is sought using the study of deaf children by the linguist Ann Senghas, to show that the aesthetic level is a ‘merging’ of visceral and intellectual faculties similar to those used in the development of language and like language this ability is stimulated by the environment. These findings are a counterclaim to the ‘innate’ humanist charge that overhangs discussions on feelings and the sentient; claims that were most famously made against Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, when he discusses emotional alienation within the mode of production. Hence Tedman’s chapter, Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts as a Work of Art reexamines this early classic and contests that Marx was himself on the path to understanding a non-humanist, materialist aesthetic component as part of the base and superstructure model.

In fact Marx’s awareness of the role of feeling resides not only in the ideas and writing in this text but also because of the three-dimensional structure of Marx’s own original construction of the text.  For Marx did not create this book in a linear fashion, as it has so far been published (and as book publishing will allow), but he designed it so that the structure of the book expresses its content in a sculptural, three-dimensional format. One example drawn from this by Tedman, using some of Margaret Fay’s original research, is how Marx organised the themes of Wages of Labour and Profit of Capital, in separate columns, on the same page side by side, with the theoretical contradictions between them revealed in these columns in adjacent positions. Eventually, some of the columns, overwhelmed by these contradictions, cancel themselves out and disappear all-together, and hence the shape of the work changes, suggesting that:

 “Marx must have been attempting to restructure his own material method of textual production in line with the results of his research.”

Is Marx making a work of art out of his ideas and forging them tactually and sensibly in order to communicate their influence to his reader, and does this work therefore perform on the aesthetic level? It certainly shows that Marx was aware of the feelings of the reader and that he could practice an engagement with the visceral and the corporeal to strengthen his intellectual points, rather than just ignoring these things as many writers do, or dulling them down, as in an alienating or biblical-narrative type framework. By the construction of the form of this work Marx demonstrates that sensory alienation and also non-alienation, major theoretical themes in the Manuscripts, are not just cerebral but tied to materials and shapes, design and general sensory environments.

 The ‘bourgeois’ humanist accusation levelled at Marx in his discussion of feelings and alienation in the text is countered here in favour of the bodily reality and formality of his writing, and the physical ‘shape’ and texture of it (the large landscape sheets of paper handsewn together by Marx play an important part in this). Tedman concludes:

“the EPM, is equivalent to an avant-garde left modernist artwork, but with a rather postmodern, hypertextual deconstructive, textual strategy”.

For Tedman, Marx's awareness of an aesthetic, sense level of practice is always present in his work (he furnishes examples from Capital) even if it is not as radically and artistically expressed as in this early work, understood as a radical new form for a radical new content.

Tedman reconstructed Marx's original design for the 1844 Manuscripts using large sheets of paper and has also published an ebook facimile of this using hypertext links and the original pagination. 

The origins of the aesthetic level are examined in the following chapters: East/West and the Marx-Zeno Dialectic, looks at the counter-feeling, logocentric tradition of Western philosophy. This is posed against the ‘other’ sensuous element of some Eastern philosophies and in relation to Marx’s interest, via Hegel, in the pre-Socratics, to throw light on the non-logocentric, feeling and hence aesthetic slant of his ideas.

The Origins of Kitsch and Counterfeit Dialectics examines the emergence of an aesthetic that is now integrated into everyday life - and how kitsch became the proscribed aesthetic of the ruling class and entered into the class struggle via the official status given to it by the French Academy. And from here on in it emerged practically, specifically through art objects, actions, behaviours, mentalities, and events, even whole periods (the Third Republic).

To examine this we are taken through the changes in the mode of production in Capitalism that led to the specific form of associated alienation for which kitsch is the formal, visual, psychological and artistic expression.  We see how it was specially promoted via the work of artists like Charles Le Brun, who was chosen in the 1600s to head up the group organisation of the French Academy of Art. Based in anthropomorphism, Le Brun’s work heralds the debasement of humanness and of the human senses, “the likening of humans to animals and animals to humans (homo faber).” …and helped to forge the substantiation of dehumanisation and alienation. Tedman submits that imbuing Le Brun with such power at this point in time created an important fulcrum for the state to fulfil its political desires in aesthetics.

Another example of struggles taking place specifically on the aesthetic level comes from the political context of the July Monarchy of Louis Phillippe, which is the theme of the chapter Paris 1844, Manet, Courbet, Marx. Here Tedman demonstrates a convergence of clashes and contradictions that appear to manifest on this date and place, various aspects of which are observed in the political, philosophical and artist production of these three protagonists.

The origins of artists like Le Brun in all epochs, whose work fits neatly into the correct type of aesthetic necessary for the needs of the dominating mode of production is revealed by Tedman’s intersection of the writings of Clement Greenberg, Louis Althusser and Walter B enjamin, which leads him to the conclusion that there is  indeed such an entity as Art Aesthetic State Apparatuses. He finds this:- in Althusser’s critique that bourgeois philosophers maintain a very strict distinction (bifurcation) between science and ideology which then filters down through education and specifically art education, coupled with a denial, on the part of these philosophers of knowing what philosophy is actually doing, as a practice; and, from Walter Benjamin’s criticism of those “undergoing a revolutionary development only in terms of mentality” and who distance their work from technique (the amalgamation of tactile and ‘feelings’ in materials) and hence its relationship to the current day mode of production and means of production. Artists who are like this, says Benjamin, have solidarity with the proletariat only in the mind and not as material producers; and while, says Tedman, Greenberg champions the formal materialism of American Expressionism (Rothko, Jackson Pollock) he still writes about it from a position of the unaccountable in tandem with the general line in educational art departments that ‘there is no accounting for taste’. And this point of view is the political and philosophical basis for the artist who is embedded in the Capitalist social relations of production. These relations are then refined and shaped by them in their specific field of production to become an aesthetic that emerges from the prevailing social fabric and from the controlling state bodies behind them, as Aesthetic State Apparatuses. This is also helped by the fact that the subject who is embedded in this environment as an artist functions partly unconsciously amongst the prevailing alienation of these conditions.

We find that a real examination of the physical and mental affectivity of these issues is prohibited because this would involve science over the prevalent denial of knowledge and a development of the relationship between science and art. The argument that these conditions begin very early in the formation of the subject, is also advanced in the chapters The Family as Aesthetic State Apparatus and Art and Education.

One of the final chapters Soviet Avant Garde Aesthetics: the Art ASA and Gender in the Russian Revolution uses the aesthetic level and the concept of aesthetic state apparatuses to analyse “base/superstructure interaction in the period of the emergence of the artistic avant-garde in Russia” about 1917.

Here, Tedman charts the breaking down of gender barriers that led to a flurry of woman artists, such as has not been seen before or since, and of changes to the arts, artworks, literature and design because of changes in the base. This is complex. The domains of art and economics, for example, although they are obviously linked, do not develop at the same rate, and in relation to each other they are, using Lenin's concept, “uneven”. A mechanism for the aesthetic level is thus honed in on in the writings of Malevich, which tended to be  quite meta-physical at times, though not always, (perhaps lost in translation also), and not quite in tandem with his more materialist artistic production. So we find that Malevich’s visual practice as it functions on the aesthetic level contradicts his intellectual theorisation, thus exposing a contradiction between the aesthetic level (his paintings) and what could probably be described as the ideological level (his conscious intellect and writings).

Aesthetics & Alienation offers the chance to examine relationships between the state, the status quo, and sentient emotion, the latter of which is argued as the most necessary element for ‘glueing’ the other elements and hence the base/superstructure and the social system, together. This is a basis for understanding how feelings can be and are directed by the industries and institutions that primarily specialise in their arousal: the media, the arts, design and education. The essays are anchored in convincing arguments and research that give credence to the proposed ‘scientificity’ of the method and the enquiry. With so much discussion in many domains, perhaps the conjecture steps a bit ahead of itself sometimes and of the reader, but this is always reeled back quite quickly and the overall points are eloquently concluded.

From my own point of view this book offers an inspiring improvement on the gossipy narrative that grounds most art history and that I have always found inadequate, and of the possibility of substantially linking art to other fields. Hence the poor dandyish ‘flimsy’ and ‘bourgeois’ subject no longer stands, sadly, alone but becomes engaged in a whole fabric of connected knowledge including politics. Aesthetics & Alienation delivers real philosophical and political credibility to the role of feelings which concerns every discipline, social science and aesthetic practitioners like artists, designers and architects. Until now these latter have seen little inroad into the huge traditional body of philosophy and science that can really offer support to the scientific materiality of their own disciplines, and signficantly place them in relation to other subjects that they are intuitively, if not officially in the academic sense, intertwined with.

Gary Tedman's facsimile version of Marx's original construction of The Notebooks 1844, Karl Marx: The Hypertext Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 is available in Kindle format from Amazon. Amazon link here

Thursday, September 10, 2026

Why do Communists and the Left always have to be Shouty Humanists in the Media?

For reasons to do with the way the media functions in democratic capitalism as a state apparatus,* this apparatus only allows communists to appear in the media as ‘shouty humanists’, in other words they must seem to place sentiment and moralism before science, and passion and emotionalism before reason, entirely going against the grain of classical Marxism. This is of course a way to prove in practice to the audience all the usual falsehoods about communists, from the mild reproaches of them being well meaning but inevitably wrong idealists to always angry totalitarian dictators.

This strategy has worked very well for the bourgeoisie for years now, even to the extent that leaders of most of the western communist parties usually follow this rule, and such conforming individuals are able rise to the top of these parties for this reason. The question is how this happens; there are two essential ways that such eventualities come to be: The first is by the simple process of reward and punishment, those individuals who follow these rules are rewarded by the system, mostly obliquely, and given more airtime and so on and thus seem more apparently successful than their opponents. Secondly, there is an unconscious following of these rules in the general sense, with persons with affective practices that behave 'obdiently' felt to be more socially positive. The latter is because of the underlying alienation from labour in capitalism.

Any Marxist will know that Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao, were fairly personable people in terms of their personalities. They were witty, highly intelligent and had the ability to write many books. They were theorists of communism but also studied the contemporary philosophy and sciences and were up to date with the most advanced scientific theories in diverse fields. Marx for instance could both read, speak, and translate on sight multiple languages. Of these figures, only Lenin and Mao became the leaders of actual political parties.

However, since this time, such individuals have, I think, been prevented by various means. To start with, in politics in general there has been a pervasive anti-intellectualism and suspicion of those who ‘know stuff’ in favour of those whose demeanour is more spontaneous and passionate. For instance, there has been, e.g. in the UK, on the left Arthur Scargill (miners leader), and Neil Kinnock, and currently in France there is Jean Luc Melenchon of LFI, or there was Georges Marchais of the PCF. In all these cases their political positions have been presented in the media in shouty humanistic terms (I am aware that Kinnock was hardly a communist of course).  We could of course debate whether these individuals were sincere or not, but really this is not the point. Also, one must be aware of politics in at least more than one democratic capitalist country to truly see how this is a pattern, a technique.

- The media has been a modern technical mass media since at least the rise of the Nazis, and it has been able to use mass techniques and has a lot of practical knowledge based in how to sway feelings, and make it seem as though certain things and positions and people are popular, and they are capable of pushing certain things that they as a class want, but can make that pushing seem like audience pull, as if it is the democratic will of the authentic masses. The new social media despite its great promise has only made this more intense through the constant intervention of troll farms and biased computerized algorithms.

This brings me to the concept of Affective Practices and to the idea of contradiction within an affective practice. Which means, whilst it is possible for a person to express ideas that are rational or Marxist, it is at the same time possible for this same individual to behave affectively in a manner that goes against this. I would venture to say that this is even the norm for most of the media figures on the political left who get near to socialism.

The techniques of how the bourgeois class deal with this problem of appearance, and what is essentially the process of political branding involves a body of knowledge that has been built up over decades in the apparatuses of the media which they either own or direct via the state.


* The theory of the media that allows me to say these things (rather raw and newly formed I admit) I have worked on elsewhere, likewise the concept of alienation that I am using here can be read about and is supported in my book Aesthetics & Alienation. Note that here I have only been able to say these things in a schematic fashion, unfortunately

Gary Tedman

Thursday, September 3, 2026

Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre and the Role of Feelings in History

by Iona Singh


The first difficulty with history, the one that hits you like an arrow, is the human factor: how should feelings be involved in recording the past.

For example, how should historians themselves deal with their own feelings, and should feelings be allowed to endow historical accounts of events and people, not only of the individuals involved, but in their relationship to each other, as groups and communities that have commonality according to class and culture, and even across populations.

Obviously, everyone experiences a variety of feelings according to how their life has gone and how they react emotionally according to forces, circumstances, psychology, expectations and traditions, making any comprehension of the feelings involved in a history of this potentially infinitesimal and mentally confusing. Hence, understanding the role of feelings and emotions, the emotional life of the past has caused great difficulty. 

Arguments between modern historians, since Ranke, put very generally, veer towards making history an ‘unemotional’ collection of information, empirical facts, minimising or negating feelings on the part of the historian in favour of data. Or the school that opposes this by contrast, stating there is no such thing as empirical history because all history is churned out by historians and is therefore entirely subject to the feelings and persona of historians; that history can only be a kind of reflection of who the historian is.

Bloch and Febvre solved the dilemma between these two spheres with their remit that history must have a notion of feeling built into it, providing that this conception of feeling is entirely scientific according to their historiography and method. They reiterate in fact, that history requires the sensory, sensible element of feeling in order to be scientific at all.

How did they arrive at this?

Bloch and Febvre* understood the historian as limited by their own species, which lends her or him the ability to have empathy, sometimes profound empathy for other members of their species (and others as well). To the extent that the human historian can emotionally conjecture - provided they first research the historical circumstances, situations and events as thoroughly as possible - as to how and why individuals, groups and communities behaved, felt and reacted, even if they lived 1000 years ago. Any precision here comes from the amassing of information by the historian, doing as thorough a job as possible, to enable them to construct an emotional ‘environment’ within which lived and felt the lives and communities of the past. 

Jules Michelet and Augustin Thierry, predecessors of Bloch and Febvre, heralded immersion into the study of the adventures of people and their customs and social life. They provided Bloch and Febvre with the tools to shift the concept of an ‘idea’ coming from a single individual, to a collation of ideas and feelings (unconscious communication is alluded to here)  dispersed beyond the individual to groups and communities.  

On a wider scale, Bloch and Febvre's concept of feeling or sensibilities as they called them, go beyond historical studies to provide assistance to the general question of empiricism versus idealism. A problem that existed/exists in most disciplines and in its purer form in philosophy. The issue of how ‘ideas’ and the rational relate to the ‘empirical’, the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’, is understood here by adding a conciliatory element; a sensuous processor that brings together and facilitates internal and external information - the visceral human faculty of sensibilities. Although acknowledged in prior historiographical arguments, sensibilities are presented by Bloch and Febvre in the specific form of a scientific method for history. Engaging thus the material human nervous system, the evolution of the body, emotionally and linguistically (which can also be construed in the work of Chomsky and Freud among others), in a systematic and fundamental schema, and hence as scientific. As such this science has common ground with other sciences that also shape Bloch and Febvre's work (examples of these are found in Bloch's essays in my book): psychology, physiology (nourishment), technology (the effect of radio transmission and the history of time keeping), biology, geography and physics.

Other influences on Bloch and Febvre on this path may have been Marx’s inclusion of the role of feelings in his ‘1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ and in 'The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon'.And their ideas run parallel to Walter Benjamin's text ‘The Author as Producer’, all themes more recently covered by Gary Tedman’s conception of an aesthetic level of practice (Tedman, 2012, Zero Books).

Iona Singh

* See Lucien Febvre's essay 'Sensibilities and history', RFP 1973.

Review of Aesthetics & Alienation, by Gary Tedman, Zero Books, 2012

By Iona Singh Aesthetics & Alienation is rigorous, most of the chapters first appeared as peer-reviewed essays, and it is audacious i...